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SPECIAL FEATURE
COMMONWEALTH v. WASSON:
INVALIDATING KENTUCKY'S
SODOMY STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
By THoMAs P. LEwis*
Two articles in this issue discuss Commonwealth v. Wasson,' the
recent and highly controversial case in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court by a 4-3 vote invalidated Kentucky's sodomy law.2 The majority
ruled that the law violates an offender's "right of privacy" and denies
equal protection of the law? Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution,
which speaks to "absolute and arbitrary power," was central to both
rulings
As suggested by the titles of their articles, the authors state view-
points and conclusions that are at polar extremes. University of Oklahoma
Law Professor Shirley Wiegand and her assistant and coauthor, law
student Sara Farr, applaud the reasoning and result of Wasson in Part of
the Moving Stream: State Constitutional Law, Sodomy, and Beyond5
Their title is drawn in part from Justice Leibson's opinion for the court's
majority. After noting that since 1961, half of the fifty states that had
declared sodomy to be a crime had decriminalized it, Leibson stated:
"Thus our decision, rather than being the leading edge of change, is but
a part of the moving stream."6 Wiegand and Farr find the court's result
to be fully supported by the constitutional text, especially when inter-
preted in light of expert testimony of record in the case and relevant early
constitutional precedents upon which the majority relied
* William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1954,
LL.B. 1959, University of Kentucky, SJ.D. 1964, Harvard University.
' Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
'KY. REv. STAT. § 510.010 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1990).
'Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491-92, 500.
' Id. at 494-500. Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution states: "Absolute and arbitrary power
over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority." KY. CoNSr. § 2.
Shirley A. Wiegand & Sara Farr, Pat of the Moving Stream: State Consituitmal Law,
Sodomy, and Beyond, 81 Ky. L.. 449 (1992-93).
'Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
'Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 456-62.
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In Rule of Men,8 recent University of Kentucky College of Law
graduate John Roach aims a heated blast at the Wasson majority's
reasoning and result. Roach finds the court's reference to a "moving
stream" to be quite misleading, claiming that only one other state has
decriminalized sodomy with a ruling from its highest court grounded
clearly on its state constitution." What state legislatures have done or
may do in making policy, Roach believes, is largely irrelevant to
constitutional adjudication, which finds legitimacy in constitutional
text and precedent.'0 Because the court lacked these legitimate
sources according to his analysis, Roach charges the majority with
engaging in a decision-making process that depends on nothing more
than their "whims and personal opinions."" Thus his title, implying
that the decision has gutted what has become the hallowed and
axiomatic description of our system as a government of laws, not of
men.
The articles are freestanding submissions, not halves of a
structured debate. For that reason, positions taken in one article are
not directly responded to by the other, though the authors of course
cover a great deal of common ground. Professor Wiegand served as
co-counsel for defendant Jeffrey Wasson in the district and circuit
courts, and participated in the preparation of his brief on appeal. It is
understandable that in her article she would give close attention to the
course of litigation and the Kentucky Supreme Court majority's
responsive methodology. And since Wasson prevailed at every level
of trial and appeal, it is also understandable that Wiegand would write
approvingly of the building blocks of that success. One particularly
important building block was the use of "expert" witnesses;'2 another
was the participation, through briefs, of an extraordinary array of
supportive amici curiae.'3 On a broader front, Wiegand and Farr give
substantial attention to the potential for expansion of civil rights and
liberties, a sort of new frontier beyond the settled territory of federal
constitutional rights, that can be pioneered through state court
interpretations of state constitutions. 4
Roach defined his topic more pointedly as an analysis of the
Wasson court's use of constitutional text and precedent. Like Wiegand
and Farr, he notes the potential importance of state constitutional
decisions, but rather than encourage expansion in this area, he
'John C. Roach, Note, Rule of Men, 81 KY. LJ. 483 (1992-93).
'Id. at 487-88.
"Id.
" Id. at 483.
'= See Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 456-57.
1Id. at 474-75.
"Id. at 450.
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expresses the hope that the courts will not "invent" new rights.,' He does
not address the details of defense counsel's strategies or the court's
specific responses to them.
The parallels between the polarity of the authors in these articles and
the differences between Wasson's majority and dissenting justices pose
some interesting questions for the reader. Surprisingly, there is no open
disagreement about the proper approach to constitutional interpretation,
at least at the barest descriptive level. Justice Leibson, writing for the
majority, purportedly embraced "original intent" of the framers as his
guide to interpretation,'" and I believe it is fair to say that his opinions
generally voice this approach. Wiegand and Farr note the, use of this
standard in the case.17 Roach and certainly the dissenting justices bear
down heavily on this standard as the appropriate one."'
Two major factors appear to account for the differences between the
majority and dissenting opinions. The first polarizing factor, obviously,
is the difference in the justices' conclusions about what was intended by
the framers. In 1890-91, the constitutional convention essentially carried
forward the 1792 constitution's bill of rights (as intervening constitutional
conventions had done), and included section 2,1' which had been
included in Kentucky's third constitution in 1850.0 Section 2 was
pivotal in Wasson. Focus on its language for a moment: "Absolute and
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."' The original
purpose of this provision is not helpful; it is reasonably clear that the
proponents of section 2 in the convention of 1849 were motivated by a
fear of uncompensated governmental deprivation of their property in
slaves. That problem had disappeared before 1890. Moreover, if
section 2 was, at bottom, intended as anything more than a rhetorical
flourish in 1849 or 1890, it certainly was not couched in fact-specific
language. What does section 2 mean?
Is it relevant to contemplate what sorts of governmental regulation in
other contexts the framers of 1849 and 1890 would have denounced as
absolute and arbitrary power? Here we get agreement on relevance from
"Roach, supra note 8, at 483-84.
W asson, 842 S.W.2d at 492-93.
,Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 472.
"Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 504 (Lambert, 3., dissenting), 514 (Wintersheimer, ., dissenting);
Roach, supra note 8, at 494-95, 505-06.
"Ky. CoNsr. § 2.
See generally Ken Gormley & Rhonda Harman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A Blaentenimal
Cdebration, 80 Ky. U. 1 (1991-92) (tracing among other developments, the textual evolution of
the provisions of the present Kentucky Constitution's Bill of Rights).
Ky. CoNSr. § 2.
"See John D. Dyche, Section 2 of the Kentucky Consftution-Where Did it Come From and
What Does it Mean?, 18 N. KY. L. Rnv. 503 (1990).
1992-93] W,4soNv
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the justices and Roach, but very different conclusions from their
applications of the idea. Justice Leibson found an original intent of the
framers in 1890 to adopt the philosophy of John Stuart Mill; Justice
Wintersheimer, dissenting, found that conclusion to be irresponsible. '
Roach and the dissenters believe it is highly relevant, even controlling,
to consider the traditions of the people at the time the Kentucky
Constitution was adopted.' On the basis of the historical record, going
back even to ancient times, they believe it is evident that the framers, the
populace and the judges of the time did not entertain doubts about the
legitimacy of criminalizing homosexual sodomy."
Justice Leibson rejects this last inquiry, at least in the Wasson/section
2 context, as a "misdirected" application of original intent27 Based
principally on early judicial pronouncements of the meaning of section 2's
language, Leibson believes that the original intent of the framers was to
create a right of privacy in the mode of John Stuart Mill's philosophy. In
Leibson's opinion, judges must pursue and actuate that generalized
original intent on the basis of the world in which they live, not the world
of 1890.28
There is sound precedent for the Leibson formulation in its relating
of contemporary knowledge to an original principle. Even Robert Bork
agrees that Brown v. Board of Education' was correctly decided,
despite historical evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment probably contemplated racially segregated schools.'
According to Bork, in light of contemporary knowledge of the actual and
inherent inequality of separate, segregated school systems, desegregation
became the only proper application of the principle of equal protection
the framers had drafted." Roach challenges the Leibson formulation as
applied in Wasson by asking rhetorically: "But, if original intent is to be
gauged in light of contemporaneous knowledge and understanding, what
new and relevant discourses are there regarding human nature? What new
authority is there?"'32
The reader might consider whether these differences of opinion are
merely variations of technique in describing constitutional interpretation.
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 496-97 (Ky. 1992).
Id. at 512-13 (Wintersheimer, 3., dissenting).
See id. at 504 (Lambert, ., dissenting); Roach, supra note 8, at 494-95.
ZS See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 504 (Lambert, 3., dissenting); Roach, supra note 8, at 484-85.
tWasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497.
"Id. at 492-99. Mill's thoughts will be elaborated upon below; for now it sutfces to stunmarize
the applicable principle as the idea that individuals are not accountable to society for conduct that
affects themselves but not others.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
ROBERT H. BORK, THE T~mprr', oF AMmuCA 75-76 (1990).
"Id. at 74-84.
Roach, supra note 8, at 505.
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These differences, in Wasson at least, might not lead to different results in the
absence of the second polarizing factor. Disagreement about the answers to
one or more of a number of very closely related questions provides the
context in which interpretive technique becomes a determinating fictor. These
questions include:
(1) What place, if any, do considerations of traditional morality have in
the formulation of legislative policy to promote or protect the general welfare
by disapproving given conduct, in the absence of harm-presumed or
provable, threatened or actual-to others?
(2) Assuming that at least some concern for actual or threatened harm to
others or to society is necessary to justify regulation of conduct, who has the
burden of persuasion regarding the conduct's potential or lack thereof for
harm, and by what standard of proof should relevant evidence be judged?
(3) If by traditional, even ancient, and contemporary standards (standards
that obviously may not be universally accepted), given conduct has been and
continues to be deemed immoral, is that judgment evidence that actual harm
to society is widely perceived, and if so is that perception relevant and
material evidence?
(4) Can actual or potential harm to the actorjustify regulation of the actor
in the absence of acceptable knowledge of direct potential harm to others?
(5) Does the constitution provide a clear answer to any of these
questions?
Some types of conduct that appear to be suitable candidates for
consideration in light of these questions are adultery, bigamy, prostitution,
incest, and homosexual or heterosexual sodomy, with oral and anal categories.
Public solicitation of sexual activity may be regarded as a separate category.
Additional candidates less deeply grounded in traditional morality might
include drug use, drinking, smoking, cockfighting, driving without a seat belt,
nude dancing before a voluntary audience, and private, but regulated,
lotteries.33
I. STATE COURTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The opening theme of Wiegand and Farr's article prompts some general
observations in advance of more specific consideration of the Wasson
That the constitution speaks to this sulject should be of no necessary consequenc. We are
told absolute and arbitrary power exists nowhere in a republic. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text. It may not be safe in this context to pursue this thought too far. What might we conclude if we
parsed the 1891 constitution for examples of violations of its own section 2, bearing in mind that we
are inquiring what it is that the people of 1891 decided we can or cannot do in 1993? If it is argued
that the constitution does not speak with absolute authority because it is su1ject to amendment, we
must note that the amendment process depends on the same majority with which section 2 is
concerned. Besides, that line of thought would generally move the search by the people of a state for
examples of absolute power up to the federal level of government.
WASON
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opinion. Their theme is candidly stated: "A revolution is taking place
among those who seek social change through litigation. Rather than
continuing to look to the U.S. Constitution for protection of established
rights, as well as the expansion of these rights, lawyers are searching their
state constitutions for such protection and expansion." It has always
been true that states may, through their constitutions or otherwise,
recognize and protect greater individual interests, rights, or "privacy"
than federal law would require, unless they go so far as to trammel the
federally protected interests or rights of others.'
If state courts respond to invitations to move more vigorously into the
arena of civil rights and liberties, two points are worthy of special
consideration. The first is that any change from federal doctrine can only
expand upon, not detract from, federal civil rights and liberties.'
Expansion necessarily builds upon a substantial repository of doctrine
established by the United States Supreme Court over decades of
experience in the field. Some who urge greater state court intervention in
this context appear to be driven by the idea that civil rights and liberties
are a good thing, and one simply cannot get too much of a good thing.
This general idea has broad appeal, but no actual claim to truth. A dose
of caution may be the better part of wisdom. Nonetheless, there surely is
room for some improvement on federal doctrine in some specific areas
where parallel constitutional provisions exist and each state constitution
has some provisions that differ from the U.S. Constitution and reflect
special state traditions that vary from national traditions.
The second point concerning state courts' expansion of rights derived
from state constitutions was alluded to early in our country's history,
albeit in a somewhat different context, by Chief Justice John Marshall's
famous reminder that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding."37 One implication of this admonition is the evident
importance of constitutional decisions. We have come to expect courts to
protect individuals from the excesses of the majority, but there is an
Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 450.
3See, eg., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (referring approvingly to Supreme Court's
"expressions that a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards"); Murdock
v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630-36 (1874) (affirming decision of Tennessee court on state
law issue and noting that the Court must 'eceive the decision of the State Court as conclusive" on
nonfederal question). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n4 (1983) (citing Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935), for the proposition that Court'sjurisdiction fails where sate
or nonfederal ground for state court decision is adequate to support the decision).
'See U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land, ... anything in the ... Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that state officials could not resist
school desegregation plan in an attempt to nullify equal protection rights of minority students, as
established in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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unavoidable risk that courts will sometimes discharge their protective
function incorrectly or improperly. The result can only be that an
individual will receive too little or too much protection, the latter
clearly risking infringement of majority rights. It is therefore
important that a court do all it reasonably can to produce "right"
results.
A second implication Marshall's reminder has for state courts
stems from the special role they perform, a role summed up as the
"common law tradition." State judges are most experienced in the
development of the common law. In this area, they are the designated
policy makers, and they naturally become accustomed to that role. But
rules of law (policy) flow from results arrived at and rationalized case
by case. A chapter in a hornbook, for example, may state rules that
reflect the distillation of hundreds of cases. Courts draw on any
source that might contribute to reaching a sensible result in a case.
While we expect a decent respect for the decisions of earlier courts
in the interest of stability, we also know that the common law is in
a more or less constant state of incremental change at the hands of the
judges. We expect and even depend on judges to resolve disputes on
the basis of their learning, experience and best judgment.
Constitutional adjudication is different. Here, results are supposed
to flow from preestablished rules in the form of constitutional text as
understood in light of appropriate aids to interpretation. The rules of
law that emerge from constitutional adjudication are not easily
modified. We commit policy making to courts in their common law
role because we need them. But they are not the ultimate policy
makers; their common law policy is subject to modification, in light
of experience, by the legislature. In constitutional adjudication,
however, the courts effectively become supreme over the legislative
branch. The only source of that supremacy is the constitution. A
special demand for legitimacy in decision making is therefore made
of the courts, a demand that cannot be satisfied by techniques and
habits carried over from the common law tradition of decision
making.
II. THE WASON CASE
The majority in Commonwealth v. Wasson,' in an opinion by
Justice Leibson, invalidated Kentucky's sodomy law as a deprivation
of a constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy 9 and as a denial of
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
" Id. at 491.
WAGON
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the equal protection of the law.40 Both rulings drew upon the same
constitutional language from the Kentucky Constitution's Bill of Rights,
quoted by the court as follows:
§ 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majori-
ty41
The court's opinion presents a number of important questions of
methodology and substance in constitutional adjudication. My intention
is to limit comment to two issues that are not addressed at length
elsewhere in this feature. These issues relate to the nature of the "right of
privacy" announced by the court and the unusual state of the record in
the case.
A. The Right of Privacy in Kentucky
The court recognized that there is no mention of a right of privacy in
the U.S. Constitution or the Kentucky Constitution 2 But from a
potpourri of sources, including principally a collection of early cases but
also including an 1890 Harvard Law Review article entitled The Right of
Privacy,43 the court adopted the title for the right and fleshed out its
content, beginning with a quotation from Commonwealth v. Campbell:"
"Man in his natural state has the right to do whatever he chooses and
has the power to do. When he becomes a member of organized society,
under governmental regulation, he surrenders, of necessity, all of his
natural right the exercise of which is, or may be, injurious to his fellow
citizens. This is the price that he pays for governmental protection, but
it is not within the competency of a free government to invade the
sanctity of the absolute rights of the citizen any further than the direct
protection of society requires.... It is not within the competency of
Id. at 491-92, 500.
' Id. at 494.
42 Id. at 492.
' Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAIv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
The authors urged common law recognition of the tort of invasion of privacy. The burden of their
article is to justify recognition of the tort, reasoning from analogy, and to delineate its initial scope.
117 S.W. 383 (1909).
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government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to regulate his
conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him
any liberty the exercise of which will not directly injure society. '
The court noted that the Campbell case had relied on and quoted from
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, which it set forth in part:
"'The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute ... . The
principle requires liberty of taste and pursuits; of framing the plan of
our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such
consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
The court felt that there was "little doubt" but that the views of Mill,
"which were then held in high esteem, provided the philosophical
underpinnings for the reworking and broadening of protection of
individual rights that occurs throughout the 1891 Constitution." 7 What
lies behind the phrasing of this sentence is not clear. There was no
significant "reworking and broadening" of the text of the bill of rights in
the 1891 constitutiones It might be supposed that On Liberty and other
essays by Mill had some influence on what was reworked in 1891--the
detailed limitations on legislative power outside of the Kentucky Bill of
Rights." Be that as it may, the court has often recognized that those
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494-95 (quoting Campbell, 117 S.W. at 385 (invalidating an ordinance
that outlawed the possession of intoxicating liquor, even for private use)) (emphasis added by Justice
Leibson).
" Id. at 496 (quoting Campbell, 117 S.W. at 386 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859))).
The full text of Nfill's On Liberty can be found in JoHN STUART MNik, THREE ESSAYS 5 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1975) (1912).
4' Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497.
" See generally Gormley & Hartman, supra note 20. The sentence in section 1 of the 1891
constitution, 'hird: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness," though not
explicit in the 1850 constitution, appears in essence in the preamble: "We, the representatives of the
people of the State of Kentucky, in convention assembled, to secure to all the citizens thereof the
enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and property, and of pursuing happiness, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for its government." KY. CoNsr. of 1850, pmbl.
This section 1 language is historically popular phraseology, but the one half of the sentence
potentially wars with the other one person's interest in "safety" may conflict with another's interest
in "happiness." This has never been more obvious than in 1993. In any event, the language does not
lend itself to concrete application.
" Another Mill essay, Consideratlios on Representative Government, proposed proportional
representation in the election of the legislature. See MIL, supra note 46, at 145. This idea was
picked up in some state constitutions, including Kentucky's, but in provisions dealing with the
election of members to corporate boards of directors. See, ag., KY. CoNsr. § 207 (requiring
cumulative voting in the election of directors).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
new limitations essentially responded to the legislature's egregious abuses of
power in the routine day-to-day affairs of the people and the state so
Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that in a few cases decided within two
to three decades of the ratification of the Kentucky Constitution of 1891, the
court espoused Mill's philosophy as constitutional doctrineYs
Having established to their satisfaction that the people in 1891 constitu-
tionalized Mill philosophy, the majority said that a line must be drawn at
"harmful consequences to others." 2 But it then immediately added:
Modem legal philosophers who follow Mill temper this test with an
enlightenedpaternalism, permitting the lawto intervene to stop self-inflicted
harm such as the result of drug taking, or failure to use seat belts or crash
helmets, not to enforce majoritarian or conventional morality, but because
the victim of such self-inflicted harm becomes a burden on society 3
Such a qualification of an earlier principle that had been stated in broad and
abstract form would not be out of the ordinary in the context of a court's
development of malleable common law. But in the context of constitutional
interpretation as developed in Wasson, it has an unbalancing effect, like that
of inertial force when sudden braking or an unexpected turn occurs. The court
had just endorsed the idea that in 1891 the framers intended to write the
views of Mill, as expressed in his quoted language, into the Kentucky
Constitution? But apparently anticipating that Mill views would be sticky
in other cases, some yet to be decided, the court lifted the core of his
philosophy ("In the part which merely concerns himselt his independence is,
of right, absolute ... .,)" back out of the constitution on the basis of a
virtually boundless qualifying concept authored by "modem legal philoso-
phers." This was not an application of the concept that an original principle
should be applied in light of contemporary knowledge. Rather, it was a
rewriting of the principle itself in light of someone's nonconstitutional
contemporary idea. I should emphasize that I am questioning the court's
approach to discerning and explicating original intent. I am not here challeng-
so Se, eg., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. 1991) ("Most of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention felt that the real root of Kentucky's governmental problems
was the almost unlimited power of the General Assembly."); Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183
(Ky. 1985) ("concern for limiting the powers of the legislature in general ... was the primary
motivating force behind enactment of the new Kentucky Constitution in 1891').
' For what it is worth, that philosophy strikes a chord with me, for while I do not remember
specific lessons, I absorbed during my public school years Mill's idea as a central feature of
government in America. This is not really remarkable, because the abstract idea surely has nearly
universal appeal even today.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 496.
"Id. at 496-97 (citing LoRD LLOYD OF Hem .AD, INMODUCTION TO JumsPRuDCE 59 (4th
ed. 1979) (1959)).
Id. at 497.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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ing the idea that government may have some power to protect people
from themselves.
It is probably wise to leave Mill out of the Kentucky Constitution.
Mill wrote to persuade; it is arguable by implication from the range of his
arguments in On Liberty that he would regard a people's attempt to
constitutionalize his words as unsound. Moreover, reading Mill provides
stark evidence of how unfree he would regard modem society. With the
caveat that I am not a Mill scholar,s my understanding from a review
of his essay is that:
(1) He would find regulation that was grounded in "constructive"
rather than direct injury to society to be destructive of the principle he
was advancing;'
(2) He would not countenance control of the use of liquor by means
that made its supply unreasonably inconvenient to consumers, including
the masses;ss
(3) He felt that the prohibition of "Mormonism," specifically
polygamy in a community of Mormons, could not be justified,'
(4) Education was of the highest priority for Mill, but the state should
recognize that priority by creating a parental duty to provide for the
education of their children; state-provided education could be justified
only as necessary to assist children whose parents rejected their duty, and
perhaps as instruments of example.'s
Reading Mill may help clarify one's thinking about the content and
the limits of section 2, with a focus on its language. But if we attempt to
constitutionalize his core principle, there is no apparent method for
selecting which of his views explaining his meaning are appropriately
included and which ones are not. Certainly the "esteem" in which his
views may have been held in 1890 provides no map. If it did, and the
framers indeed intended to write into the constitution the principle from
Mill that was quoted in Commonwealth v. Campbell6" and repeated in
Wasson,' we would not like its implications. His lengthy essay On
"Justice Wintersheimer may be such a scholar. He addresses Mill's philosophy in the context
of the period in which Mill wrote. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 512.
MILL, -supra note 46, at 100-01.
"Id. at 108-10. In similar fashion, the liberty to gamble or fornicate having been established,
it could not properly be defeated by prohibiting supply, for profit, though (and this is not clear) Mill
might accept that suppliers could be required to operate in such fashion as to ensure that the
consumer would seek them out, rather than being aggressively solicited& Id. at 120-23.
Id. at 112-14.
"Id. at 128-30. Compulsory state-provided education was apparently anathema to Mill: "A
general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and
the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government
.'Id. at 130.
"117 S.W. 383, 385 (1909); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.6 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
WA&ONa
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Liberty, from which the above summary of his views is drawn, was
simply his written exposition of the meaning of the harm principle.
The rub is that application of the abstract Millsian idea is most often
problematical. At this difficult point, the majority opinion in Wasson is
surprising. For nowhere in this part of the court's opinion does it engage
in any independent analysis of real or perceived present or threatened
harm, to society or to the actors, from the conduct under scrutiny. Rather,
the court simply assumes that the conduct is criminalized "'because it is
inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of acceptable behavior."'63
Technically, the court might attribute this stance to the state of the record.
From the court's description it could be surmised that there was no
evidentiary or even argued theoretical basis in the record for discussing
the issue of actual harm to others.
B. The Record in Wasson
Because this was a major constitutional case, it can be questioned
whether the court should have decided any of the issues presented solely
on the basis of the record made below. Whether it had any choice under
its rules is another question. The court granted a motion for direct transfer
of the case for review, bypassing the court of appeals," and it is not
clear that the court had an avenue of escape from this exercise of its
discretion, even if it chose to seek one. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
76.205 provides that a ruling granting or denying a motion for discre-
tionary review "will not be reconsidered," and that a motion for
reconsideration, however styled, will not be accepted for filing.' If the
court considers its own initiative to be bound by its own rule, and if it
considers itself powerless to vacate a lower court judgment and order
firther proceedings having no relation to proof of guilt or innocence or
to affirm a lower court's judgment on a more limited basis than review
on the merits of tendered issues, then the die was cast when review was
granted.
The U.S. Supreme Court rarely hears cases that have not undergone
intermediate appellate review, and occasionally withdraws a grant of
review as improvidently granted leaving a lower court's judgment
undisturbed. If they do not presently exist, some techniques should be
- Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. 1992) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.2 cmt. 2, at 372 (1980)). The American Law Institute, which drafted the Model Penal Code,
stated that section 213.2 "makes a fundamental departure from prior law in excepting from criminal
sanctions deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt.
2, at 362-63.
"See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 488-89.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.20(9Xe) (made applicable to criminal appeals by Ky. P CRIM. P. 12.02).
"Id.
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developed to enable the Kentucky Supreme Court to stimulate minimal
adequacy in the development of a record in appropriate constitutional
cases.
1. The Right of Privacy
The court's adoption of Mill's philosophy, as qualified,67 put the
harm principle in issue. When first reading Justice Lambert's dissenting
opinion, and then John Roach's note, I wondered why neither focused
pointedly on the majority's treatment of the issue. They essentially rested
their criticism of the majority's result on their conclusion that support for
regulatory legislation may be found in ancient and contemporary moral
traditions, just as the U.S. Supreme Court had found in Bowers v.
Hardwick.s One probable explanation for their reticence is their
rejection of the majority's basic premise, a right of privacy as defined by
reference to Mill. On reflection, however, I wonder if an additional
explanation might derive from the contextual complexity of the issue of
harm, and the possible discomfort associated with extended factual
discussion of it.
The issue of harm having pointedly been placed in issue by the
majority, the nature of the record before the court posed a serious
problem. At the outset of its opinion, the court listed and summarized
some of the testimony of the numerous expert witnesses introduced by
the defense. It is apparent from the use of these witnesses and the array
of supportive briefs from amici curiae that a thoroughly planned and
coordinated defense was mounted at the trial and appellate levels. The
Commonwealth, however, "presented no witnesses and offer[ed] no
scientific evidence or social data."69 The case originated in district court,
and it is probable that the prosecutors initially treated it as simply another
of the hundreds of routine cases they process. Surprised or not by the
defense, the county attorney's office probably lacked the staff to respond
flly to a defense effort of the magnitude it faced in Wasson. In this
connection, however, Justice Wintersheimer's statement that the trial
judge "refused to allow the county attorney to introduce any treatises on
the subject of sodomy" must be noted."
Once a right of privacy was defined by the court, the lopsided nature
of the record shaped the court's task of applying its definition. According
,7 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Ky. 1992).
Id. at 510.
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to the court, the Commonwealth's position was simply that the General
Assembly has the right to criminalize activity it deems immoral, without
regard for whether the activity is harmful to the participants or to
others." Except for argument concerning AIDS, which was mentioned
by the majority only in the equal protection portion of the opinion,' one
might conclude that the record was actually barren of any evidence that
the conduct in question is or is not harmful to others or to the partici-
pants. The testimony of defense experts as summarized by the court early
in its opinion offered no factual enlightenment on this question.73 Briefs
amicus curiae were filed in opposition to the lower court's decision, but
the content of these briefs is not discussed by the court.
Still another explanation for the dissenters' lack of strong focus on the
harm principle, which could also go some distance towards explaining the
majority's willingness to go forward in the face of an inadequate record,
is the possibility that the right of privacy as applied in Wasson is
something different from what the majority said it is. The dissenting
opinions strongly suggest to the reader that those justices believed the
majority actually found homosexual conduct to be protected as a
"fundamental right," not simply a liberty derived from the calculus of
Mill's principle.74 There is evidence in a concurring opinion by Justice
Combs, joined by Chief Justice Stephens, that two members of the
majority accept that conclusion.' Adoption of this position would put
the issue of harm in a different light, perhaps rendering irrelevant the
types of harm that might possibly be connected to homosexual conduct.
I will return to this theme in a concluding part.
2. Equal Protection
It is not clear why the court felt it necessary or desirable to address
the equal protection issue at all. Resolution of the issue turned on the
court's rejection of any rational basis for a distinction between homo-
sexual and heterosexual sodomy. In light of the court's privacy ruling,76
however, it must follow that the legislature cannot cure the equal
protection issue by criminalizing heterosexual sodomy, for that move
would be independently unconstitutional. The effects of a lopsided and
inadequate record were further exacerbated by the court's treatment of
"Id. at 490.
"Id. at 501. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
"Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489-90. Justice Wintersheimer, dissenting, does allude to evidence of
AIDS, referring to testimony by a defense witness concerning the relationship between homosexual
conduct and the incidence of that disease. Id. at 516.
,See id. at 514 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 502-03 (Combs, J., concurring).
7See supra notes 42-63.
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defense submissions as central to the issue of equal protection. The
court made major pronouncements explicitly grounded on defense
testimony that it found to be "further substantiated by extensive
citations to medical and social science literature and treatises supplied
in Amicus Curiae briefs filed by national and state associations of
psychologists and clinical social workers, various national and state
public health associations, and organizations covering a broad
spectrum of religious denominations."
In this part, quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, the court concluded
that homosexual conduct is "in all likelihood" the product of an
immutable characteristic in its practitioners, who "form virtually a
discrete and insular minority."78 The court found Tribe's view "fully
supported ... by the medical, scientific and social science data
provided in the briefs filed herein by Amici Curiae."79 This is a very
importaint "finding." But whether this was tantamount to declaring
homosexuality the equivalent of race or gender, the court's opinion
did not treat it as a critical issue in its selection of an appropriate
constitutional standard of review for this case.'e The nominal test for
evaluating an equal protection claim is whether there is a rational or
"reasonable" basis for distinctions made by the General Assembly,8
a standard that in constitutional parlance generally signifies substantial
deference to legislative judgment. In recent years, however, the
' Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489. This language appears before the court's discussion of either of
the major issues in the case, but specific reliance appears in the equal protection segment of the
opinion. Id. at 500.
7Id. at 500 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRiBn, AMEmcm CoNsmruTONAL LAw 1616 (2d ed.
1988)).
"Id.
"We do not speculate on how the United States Supreme Court as presently constituted
will decide whether the sexual preference of homosexuals is entitled to protection under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal constitution. We need not speculate as to
whether male and/or female homosexuals will be allowed status as a protected class if and
when the United States Supreme Court confronts this issue. They are a separate and
identifiable class for Kentucky constitutional law analysis because no class of persons can
be discriminated against under the Kentucky Constitution. All are entitled to equal
treatment, unless there is a substantial governmental interest, a rational basis, for different
treatment. The statute before us is in violation of Kentucky constitutional protection in
Section Three that "all men (persons), when they form a social compact, are equal," and
in Section Two that "absolute and arbitrary power over the fives, liberty and property of
free men (persons) exist nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." We have
concluded that it is "arbitrary" for the majority to criminalize sexual activity solely on the
basis of majoritarian sexual preference, and that it denied "equal" treatment under the law
when there is no rational basis, as this term is used and applied in our Kentucky cases.
Id. at 500.
For an excellent comprehensive statement of levels of review in Kentucky, depending on
isolation and analysis of the interests affected, see Chief Justice Stephens's opinion for the court in
Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1992).
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500 (quoting Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Ky. 1986)).
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Kentucky Supreme Court has sometimes applied the test more rigorous-
ly.' This potential tendency is exemplified in Wasson.
Quoting from earlier cases he had authored, and describing the
Commonwealth's case in Wasson, Justice Leibson defined "rational basis"
as that term is "applied in our Kentucky cases": "'Butthese [explanations
of a legislative classification] are offered only as possible reasons that
could have existed, not as reasons that did in fact exist....' The
Commonwealth has tried hard to demonstrate a legitimate governmental
interest justifying a distinction [between homosexual and heterosexual
sodomy], but has failed.'" After addressing and rejecting specific
arguments by the Commonwealth, Leibson stated, "If there is a rational
basis for different treatment it has yet to be demonstrated in this case."'
Far from finding that the Commonwealth's arguments "demonstrated"
or proved anything -"in fact," Justice Leibson found many of them to be
"simply outrageous.' " These included arguments that 'homosexuals are
more promiscuous than heterosexuals, ... that homosexuals enjoy the
company of children, and that homosexuals are more prone to engage in
sex acts in public."' ' Surely the relevance of the Commonwealth's first
argument, unlinked to anything else, can be questioned. And there is
probably virtually universal agreement that persons who fit the last two
of its arguments must be dealt with on an individual basis. The only
argument found by the court to have even "superficial validity" was one
that "'infectious diseases are more readily transmitted by anal sodomy
than other forms of sexual copulation."'' T The court responded as
follows:
But this statute is not limited to anal copulation, and this reasoning
would apply to male-female anal intercburse the same as it applies to
male-male intercourse. The growing number of females to whom AIDS
... has been transmitted is stark evidence that AIDS is not only a male
homosexual disease. The only medical evidence in the record before us
rules out any distinction between male-male .and male-female anal
intercourse as a method of preventing AIDS."
" See, ag., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 813-14 (Ky. 1991)
(invalidating statute of repose as unconstitutional special legislation because distinction between
manufacturers and builders had no reasonable justification); Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 185
(Ky. 1985) ("The fundamental question is whether the General Assembly had a reasonable basis
sufficient to justify creating a separate classification for certain persons....").
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501 (quoting Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 185) (emphasis added).
"Id.
t Id.
" Id. (quoting arguments of the Commonwealth).
7 d.
" Id. The content and meaning of the rational basis test applied by the majority deserves further
exploration. In Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 689 S.W.2d 14, 18-19 (Ky. 1985), the court
stated. "The standards for classifications under the Kentucky Constitution are the same as these under
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The court had earlier noted the testimony of a "sociologist and sex
researcher (a co-author of the Kinsey Report on homosexual behavior)"
that oral and anal sex are practiced "widely" by heterosexuals. This
witness also testified that homosexuality is not a "choice" and there is no
"cure" for it.s
Given the structure and content of the opinion on the right of privacy,
the excerpt quoted above may provide a clue concerning the majority's
desire to address the equal protection issue. The issue of AIDS could
have posed a troublesome factual issue (and a difficult legal issue) under
the majority's formulation of the privacy right. But in a court willing to
draw a comparison between homosexual and heterosexual contributions
to the AIDS epidemic, a finding of potential harm to self or others could
not save the law from equal protection analysis.
C. The Issue of Harm Revisited
Consider for a moment a sodomy law, such as Kentucky's, that is
strictly enforced, though the authorities make no special effort to ferret
out offenders. When found, however, in a private setting and in the
absence of public solicitation, an offender is arrested, charged, and if
found guilty jailed, fined, or both. Suppose further that a court is satisfied
that a higher incidence of specific harms, such as AIDS and some other
diseases, can be linked to homosexual conduct. How should a harm
principle be applied? It is difficult to find close-fit analogies, but consider
liquor consumption. We know that alcohol can be personally hanful and
that some individuals will become alcoholics. We know or believe that
some individuals may become vicious when under the influence, and we
accept that individuals who drive while under the influence pose a risk
of accident. As matters stand, the person who inflicts direct harm is
punishable because of the harm, not because of the drink. We do not
outlaw drinking by all because of the risks of alcoholism to some. That'
was tried once, but it did not work. The various risks associated with
alcohol' consumption are, however, the subjects of educational programs
and a number of mandatory warnings.
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. .. A classification by the legislature should
be affirmed unless it is positively shown that the classification is so arbitrary and capricious as to be
hostile, oppressive and utterly devoid of rational basis." This is a tax case and the court was applying
a "minimal" rational basis test. Justice Leibson in Wasson certainly applied a more rigorous test,
describing it as rational basis "as this term is used and applied in our Kentucky cases." Wasson, 842
S.W.2d at 500. However, in Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1992), the court upheld an
antinepDtism statute against constitutional challenge, stating that statutorily created classifications
"must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state end" and are invalid "when these classifications
are totally unrelated to the state's purpose in their enactment, and when there is no other conceivable
purpose for their continued viability." Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).
n Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
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The question I mean to raise is whether, and if so how far, it would
advance analysis, constitutional or otherwise, to accept the hypothetical
linkage I have posited between homosexual conduct and actual direct
harm. The linkage does not say anything about an individual case, except
perhaps in the most abstract terms of statistical probabilities. The same
might be said of those who are arrested for DUI in the absence of an
actual accident causally linked to intoxication. But the analogy is flawed,
because we do not convict an individual for drinking, but for driving in
a certain condition. Moreover, the analogy is again less than perfect
because the potential victim of the driver has no say in his selection.
With respect to the problem of linking an individual to potential harm
from generalized activity, another comparison might be found in the
controversy regarding second-hand smoke in public places. Those who
conclude that both the liquor and smoke comparisons are silly apples and
oranges constructs might ask whether that conclusion derives from
rejection of underlying facts hypothetically imposed concerning homo-
sexual conduct/harm linkage, and/or from a decidedly different ranking
of the importance of the underlying individual interests that are involved.
The control of risks associated with drinking is actively pursued through
rigorous enforcement of the traffic laws. Proliferating smoking bans are
or will be strictly enforced. For comparison purposes, a strictly enforced
sodomy law was hypothesized above. Would rejection of that hypothesis
as false in fact have any bearing on the comparisons?
A different type of harm projection is the feared deterioration of
society, styled "moral deterioration!' by those who say thai any harm is
limited to those who are offended only because of their moral sensibili-
ties. That viewpoint, however, is an oversimplification according to the
views of some others, sampled below, whose claim to expert status may
be equal to that of many of the sources relied upon by the Wasson
majority." It can be inferred from some of these alternative views that
cases such as Wasson may, ironically, become part of the problem.9'
Dissenting in Wasson, Justice Lambert set the stage for this line of
thought when he said in closing his opinion:
[]t should not be doubted that this decision will be regarded as the
imprimatur of Kentucky's highest court upon homosexual conduct ....
While this is not an accurate line of thought, it is a natural one. Those
who wish to urge that homosexual conduct is immoral and those who
oppose the portrayal of homosexuality as an acceptable alternative
" The sources tendered by the defense in Waso are described by Wiegand and Farr, supra note
5, at 456-57 nn.47-51.
" The "problem" here is that decisions such as Wasson may be viewed not merely as a move
toward equal treatment of homosexuals, but rather as a condwnatin of homosexual behavior. e
infra notes 92, 109 and accompaaying text.
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lifestyle will encounter the majority opinion as a powerful argument to
the contrary.
In the absence of an additional element involving the public, such as
solicitation, statutes criminalizing sodomy, whether limited to homosexual
conduct or expanded to include heterosexual conduct, are notoriously
unenforced. This surely reflects a public attitude that predates activist
efforts to change the public's perception of homosexual conduct. It is
evident that this nonpunitive attitude coexists in the minds of many who
nevertheless strongly disapprove of homosexual activity. The law is seen
not as a prohibition to be enforced as such, but rather as a symbol of
societal disapproval.
Wiegand and Farr note that sodomy laws are not enforced in some
states, but describe the effect more harshly: "'unenforced sodomy laws are
the chief systematic way that society as a whole tells gays they are
scum."'93 And they feel that such laws remain a "sword of Damocles" for
homosexuals and provide justification for both public and private
discrimination.'
The use of traditionally unenforced laws as swords of Damocles
should meet another kind of constitutional objection. .Private discrimi-
nation can be effectively removed only through positive laws, legislative
or other. The removal of sodomy laws can assist these objectives, but
their removal is also sought by some groups in aid of a larger agenda.
Their goals include securing, through coordinated efforts of persuasion,
the law, and mandated education, what may be termed "equal respect" for
the homosexual lifestyle as well as for its practitioners. 95
The resulting struggle is between those who believe it is important to
discourage homosexual conduct and those -*ho want to promote equal
respect for the homosexual lifestyle. A victory in that struggle was in a
real sense one of the stakes in the Wasson case. What effect, if any, open
recognition of the nonenforcement of the underlying sodomy statute could
have had on the majority is speculative, but it is fairly predictable on the
basis of the record before the court that it would not have changed
anything. Certainly, at first blush, a law whose acceptance depends on a
custom of nonenforcement is an anomaly. On reflection, however, it is
not an unknown phenomenon and historic examples are probably most
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 509 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
"Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 480 (quoting Richard D. Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at
Sodom: Gays and Pivacy, 18. CoLum. Hum. RT& L. RE V. 43, 53 (1986-87)).
"Id.
"I borrow the term "equal respect" from DAVID Al. RicHARMS, TOLERA~ioN AND THE
CONsrrrrrrON passim (1986). Professor Richards seeks to justify a theory of constitutional privacy
as the underpinning of universal toleration and equal respect for each person's rational and moral
independence. He writes as a legal scholar, not as a member of any particular group.
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apt to be found in the realm of conduct traditionally deemed to be
immoral.96
Wasson removed society's statement of disapproval from the books.
The effects of removal that concerned Justice Lambert could not have
been dampened by anything the court might have been able to say in the
course of its opinion, because, as he noted, those effects flow from a
natural, though not accurate, line of thought."7 The line of thought is
simply that the result of the case delivers the wrong message. Yet what
the court did say in explaining its reasoning was naturally designed, as
opinions generally are, to persuade its listeners that it was delivering the
right message, and that persuasion was built largely on the viewpoints of
one adversary's witnesses and supporters.
There are other viewpoints. Whether they would merit acceptance is
not the point. In our society, the role of the judiciary is defined by its
reliance, indeed its absolute dependence, on a properly functioning
adversarial system. Generally one side or the other in a case must prevail,
but that is determined after full consideration of points and counterpoints
presented by the adversaries. I offer the few examples below only to
illustrate the fact that there are sources of counterpoint regarding some of
the issues upon which the majority in Wasson made "findings."'
Newspaper accounts have made us familiar with the efforts in some
education districts to install materials and lessons in the curriculum to
indoctrinate children in proper attitudes about homosexuality. In a recent
column, George Will questioned the use of the public schools as a forum
for endorsing the homosexual lifestyle. Using events in a New York City
school district as a backdrop, Will stated:
The bibliography of the "Children of the Rainbow" curriculum
recommends for first graders (preschoolers must make do with a gay
and lesbian coloring book) books such as Daddy's Roommate and
Heather Has Two Mommies and Gloria Goes to Gay Pride.
In Gloria Goes to Gay Pride, one of Gloria's mothers explains the
gay pride parade. "Some women love women, some men love men, and
some women and men love each other. That's why we march in the
parade-so everyone can have a choice."
Of Examples are laws against adultery and fornication. A classic example was Connecticut's anti-
contraceptive law as analyzed by Justice Frankfurter in Poe v. Ulnman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The
Court later overturned the law. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also ALmcANDER
M. BicKEL, THE LEAsr DANGERouS B.ANcH 147-56 (1962) (discussing Poe v. Uliman).
"Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 509.
The excerpts that follow in the text are truly random samples that came to my attention in a
variety of ways. Because my point is substantially more linited than trying to prove the merits of
any position, I made no focused research effort to locate samples of the most convincing statements
from the best experts, whoever they may be.
" George Will, Let Educators Steer Children Toward Heterosexuality, LEINGTON HERALD-
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Stressing the word "choice," Will then insisted that any steering of
children should be towards heterosexuality. Will, quoting an article
written by a former associate chairman of the Harvard University
Department of Psychology, noted that "there is reason to think 'that
a very substantial number of people are born with the potential to live
either straight or gay lives'-to 'grow in either direction.""'  A
related point is that while "sexual orientation must result from 'a
chain of events so complex that we are unaware of having made a
choice'... it is 'possible that substantial numbers of youngsters do
have the capacity to "choose". . . that is, through a sustained, lengthy
process of considered and unconsidered behaviors."""'
In discussing strategies gay men and lesbians might pursue to
achieve legislative goals, John D'Emilio, a participant in a symposium
on sex and politics, urged abandonment of a position that homo-
sexuality is not a matter of choice. "[W]hatever our short-term goals,
we need to frame arguments for them consistent with the core of
historians' discovery that sex is a malleable social construct."' "ec
Referring to a debate in which a claim was made that medical
evidence showed a lack of choice, because sexual identity is deter-
mined long before puberty, he noted that the claim was not startling,
and that it is an argument "made frequently in courts and legislatures
... by many of our most committed activists and allies."'" But he
said the argument ignores several valid points:
Secondly, at a psychological level, there is something dreadfully
wrong about basing a political movement on individual and
collective helplessness .... And thirdly, what if the argument is
simply not true? .... To argue that our identity, our sexuality, is
in effect an accident of birth or of early conditioning is to embrace
a sexual ideology that negates the choices we have made .... All
of us have made sexual choices throughout our lives.... It is time
to carve out new personal and political paths, to lay claim to the
possibility of choice, to embark on new journeys of sexual defini-
tion.!
LEADER, Dec. 6, 1992, at E2.
" Id. (quoting E.L. Pattullo, &night Talk About Gays, CoMmErARItY, Dec. 1992. at 21).
... Id. (quoting Pattullo, supra note 100, at 22).
" John D'Enilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and
History, N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 915, 921 (1986). The author is a Columbia University
Ph.D, and a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. His article is one
of several in Symposium: Se Politics and the Law: Lesbians and Gay Men Take the Offensive, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 891 (1986). His article and others in the symposium warrant full
reading for an understanding of some of the goals of the movement, and also for a better
understanding of the very personal feelings and beliefs of some of its adherents.
D'Emilio, supra note 102 at 921.
Id. at 921-22.
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In the course of a strong critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's
landmark sodomy case, Bowers v. Hardwick'°5  Professor Anne
Goldstein stated:
The idea that homosexuality is normal, however, implies a recognition
that homosexuality and heterosexuality may not be rigidly distinct,
mutually exclusive categories. ... 'Homosexuality' is the exclusive
preference of only a small percentage of those who, at some time in
their adult lives, either experience sexual desire for, or participate in
sexual acts with, persons of their own gender.... 37% of men have at
least some overt homosexual experience ... between adolescence and
old age; 10% are more or less exclusively homosexual for at least three
years between the ages of 16 and 55."s
Historian Paul Johnson, whose educational credentials trace to
Magdalen College, Oxford, among other institutions, and who has written
several best-selling texts, wrote in 1991:
Another self-inflicted wound in the advanced nations was the spread of
AIDS .... The origins of this fatal and seemingly incurable disease
.. remained obscure even in the early 1990s .... In the [western
nations] ... it was largely confined to male homosexuals and (to a
much lesser extent) to drug-users. It was the product of drug abuse and,
far more seriously, of the homosexual promiscuity which, often in
extreme form, had followed the decriminalization of homosexuality in
the 1960s and 1970s. Some male homosexuals were shown to have 300
or more sexual partners in a single year, and against this background the
disease spread rapidly. First reports of its seriousness came on 31
December 1981, when 152 cases had emerged, chiefly in San Francisco,
Los Angeles and New York; one was an intravenous drug-abuser, the
rest were male homosexuals."0 7
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Anne Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Seridng for the Hidden
Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. 1073, 1091 and n.102 (1988) (citing A. KINSEY,
SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN mE HUmAN MALE 650-51 (1948)). Compare the logical conclusions to be
drawn from these Kinsey research numbers with the conclusions attributed to the Kinsey sex
researcher, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
"' PAUL JOHNSON, MODERMN TIMEs: FROM THE TWENnES To THE NINEtIES (1991). I cannot
vouch for the accuracy of this statement of facts, but if it is near the mark, compare it with the
excerpt from the court'sopinion set forth in the text atsupra note 88, especially the reference therein
to the "only medical evidence in the record before us ...."
In making the valid point that lesbians, who are literally included within the prohibition of
Kentucky's sodomy statute, are one of the least likely groups to contract AIDS, Wiegand and Farr
state: "Of all the adult cases of AIDS in the United States through April 1991, 59% involved
homosexual or bisexual men who did not use intravenous drugs, 22% involved female and
heterosexual males who used intravenous drugs, 7% involved homosexual or bisexual males who also
used intravenous drugs, and 3% involved persons who contracted AIDS through the receipt of blood
products." Wiegand and Farr, supra note 5, at 473 n.141.
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Author George Gilder, a student of anthropology, among other
disciplines, is a passionate (and opinionated) spokesman for the role of
monogamous marriage as the civilizing force in society, the sine qua non
of civilization as we know it. He forcefully contends that the "sexual
constitution!' is more basic to our society than the U.S. Constitution itself.
In Gilder's book Men and Marriage,es consideration of male homosex-
uality is a segment, not a central theme, of his work. His theme in this
segment, incidentally, is that what he believes to be an increase in male
homosexuality is the result, not a cause, of a weakening of the role of
monogamous marriage in our society. That problem he traces to the more
general sexual liberation that has occurred in recent decades.' Gilder
notes that many leading writers and experts assume homosexuality to be
a "fixated" condition that poses no real threat and is unrelated to other
social developments."1 Concluding that research had failed us on the
issue, he acknowledges the likelihood that some homosexuals "suffer
from a profound disposition, possibly physiological in origin.'. But
he then marshals arguments to convince that an "enormous number of
homosexuals have clearly been recruited from the ranks of the physically
normal, '112 stating along the way:
The most powerful tool of the homosexual culture is the myth that
homosexuality is a fixed and immutable condition, like the color of
one's skin. Widely taught in sex-education programs in secondary
schools and in college psychology and social-science courses and
endlessly repeated in the media, the message is drummed in ...."'
Asserting that female homosexuality has "nothing whatever to do
with male homosexuality," and then reciting distressing figures of
promiscuity and disease among male homosexuals," 4 Gilder adds the
following statements, the last of which prompts the inclusion of a
warning label (Gilder sometimes writes in a strident tone, from the
According to Kentucky Department of Health Service statistics, 65% of AIDS cases reported
in Kentucky involved homosexual men, 10% involved injectable drug users, 6% involved homosexual
men who also use injectable drugs, 6% involved heterosexuals, 4% involved hemophilliacs, 3%
involved persons who contracted AIDS through receipt of blood products, 1% involved perinatal
transmission, and 5% involved undetermined sources. How Ketucm Contmact AIDS, LEmNoroN
HERALD-LEAD, Feb. 7, 1993, at Al.
101 GEORGE GLDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1986).
Id. at 69.
"' Id.
"'Id. at 71.
I Id. at 71-78.
..3 Id. at 73. The audience that concerns Gilder is composed of "sexually confused or insecure
young men who [are led] to imagine that their random lusts and social failures signify a permanent
homosexual fixation." Id.
" Id. at 73-76.
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perspective of one who believes society faces an avalanche of disinforma-
tion):
This emphatically does not mean harassing orimprisoning homosexuals.
Perhaps the worst perverion occasioned by homosexuality is the police
practice ofentrapment. But at the same time it is crucial to affirm precarious
males in their heterosexuality. Compassion for men who are already
homosexual-and our recognition that some have adjusted happily-should
not lead us to praise or affirm the homosexual alternative or to acquiesce in
its propaganda... The liberal journalists, compassionate churchmen,
tolerant sociologists, pliable psychologists, pandering politicians, and
valuefree sex educationists who condoned the most extreme homosexual
behavior as an acceptable life-style are the true sources of the AIDS
epidemic." 5
Until his retirement in 1987, E.L. Pattullo was director of the Center for
Behavioral Studies and associate chairman of the Department of Psychology
at Harvard University. In Straight Talk About Gays,"' he thoroughly
analyzes the available information that leads him to be concerned about the
message various types of societal actions deliver, especially to the young. His
analysis is more subtle, indirect, and tentative than George Gilders"7 on
some points along the way to his conclusion, but he states with assurance the
importance of ensuring "that all children clearly understand the desirability of
growing up to be heterosexual adults!"" Though not lengthy, his article
resists an abbreviated summary. When read in its entirety, it suggests a
number of counterpoints to the points made by the defense in Wasson.
Are the above sources "authoritative"? Are the sources relied on by the
court more or less authoritative? Who is an "expert" on the effects, now or
over the course of decades, of sexual behaviors? My suggestion is simple, and
by now repetitive: if expert opinion, with stress on "opinion," is to affect the
outcome in a major constitutional case, it is important for a court to be in a
position to sift through opinions that are gathered on some broader basis than
the strategy of one adversary in an adversarial setting.
CONCLUSION
Moral principles lie behind virtually all laws governing human conduct.
Professor Laurence Tribe, responding to theories propounded by others in
defense of Roe v. Wade,"9 observed:
"' Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added).
Pattullo, supra note 100.
.. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
"' Pattullo, supra note 100, at 24.
"' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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It has also been proposed that restrictions on the woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy are unconstitutional when they reflect "merely" a
moral, as opposed to an instrumental or utilitarian, justification. But all
normative judgments are rooted in moral premises; surely the judgment
that it is wrong to kill a two-week old infant is no less "moral" in
inspiration than the judgment ... that it is wrong to kill a two-day old
fetus. Archibald Cox seems correct, therefore, when he concludes that
Roe v. Wade must be wrong if it rests on the premise that a state can
never interfere with individual decisions relating to sex or procreation
"with only moral justification." 20
Professor Tribe also concludes that a defense of Roe cannot rest on a
court's ability to balance the interests in that conflict His ultimate
conclusion in support of the case is that the result can rest only on a
determination that a woman's freedom of choice is grounded in a
fundamental constitutional right of privacy, or autonomy.'
Societies have had hundreds of years to experience sexual behaviors.
Does the general tenacity across cultures and centuries of the idea that
homosexual conduct should be discouraged have any weight as evidence
that such conduct carries potential for harm to the social order? For any
who are prepared to give this question a tentative yes, is use of the
criminal law, even unenforced, appropriate?
We can again wonder if a principle more fundamental than Mill's was
at work in Wasson. It is difficult to determine just how evidence of risks
and harms associated with homosexual conduct should fit into Mill's
principle. But in light of society's heightened concern with risks of almost
any kind, and the general eagerness to control them through regulation,
it is not realistic to apply Mill's principle without some attention to what
evidence there is of harms and risks. In the absence of any comment by
the court on this issue, it is natural to wonder whether Mill's philosophy,
with or without modem philosophical modification, can actually carry the
load of protecting the conduct in question. It is not clear whether the
court's equal protection analysis would stand in the way of the General
Assembly's passage of a carefully structured new law. But no such
maneuvering could work if actually underpinning the court's result in
Wasson is the majority's conclusion that adults enjoy a fundamental right
of privacy respecting private, consensual sexual conduct, a right similar
to federal constitutional rights of privacy."
That conclusion would finesse all the questions of harm, whether
supposed harm is immediate, direct, consequential, long-term or other.
For to characterize an interest as a constitutional fundamental right of
SLAuREN CE H. TmE, AMmRCAN CoNsrutUroNAL LAw 1350 (2d ed. 1988).
21 Id. at 1350-58.
See eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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privacy or autonomy is to say that any balancing of interests, the
individual's versus society's, was accomplished in principle by the people
at an earlier time, and that the balance was struck in favor of individual
autonomy. The problem is obvious. Who would deny a judge's or any
other's personal belief that the balance ought to be struck in favor of a
fundamental right of individual autonomy? Most persons I know feel that
way. But the personal preferences of a majority in a particular mix of
judges are not supposed to be controlling. Legitimacy can be found only
in their ability to articulate a constitutional source of the preference. It is
here, I believe, that objective observers would conclude that such an
effort must somehow surmount the wall of centuries-long tradition, with
an objectively credible explanation. That effort has not yet been
confronted.
In the meantime, we are left to ponder the true meaning of the
Kentucky Constitution, and perhaps more importantly, the proper scope
of constitutional judicial review. The following articles mark a departure
point for this consideration.
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